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TRANSFER PRICING:
ACHIEVING FAIR NATIONAL
TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS*
PAMELA L. KAYFETZ" &
LEO B. HELZEL'"

L INTRODUCTION
Currently, taxation is based on the sovereignty of nations,
whereby each nation taxes income derived from businesses
within its sovereign control. International issues are addressed, to some extent, through a number of bilateral treaties,
many based on an international model or convention,l mutual
understandings, and practice. Taxation of international transactions by individual nations often results in confusion, disagreement, multiple taxation of the same income,2 and, of

* Editorial Staff: Erin C. McFadden, J.D. 1997, Golden Gate University
School of Law.
** J.D. 1994, LL.M. (Tax) 1995, and LL.M. (International Legal Studies) 1996,
all completed at Golden Gate University School of Law; M.B.A. (International
Business) 1985, Monterey Institute of International Studies.
*** J.D. 1951, Golden Gate University School of Law; LL.M. 1992, University
of California School of Law (Boalt Hall). Professor, Haas Graduate School of Business, University of California (Berkeley) (1968-present); M.B.A. 1968, University of
California (Berkeley); Certified Public Accountant, California and New York.
1. See, e.g., Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, (OECD Sept. 1,
1995). The work and development of this have involved a number of countries,
which refer to this model in the settlement of disagreements. The United States
and Japan have both been very involved with the development and evolution of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [hereinafter OECD]
work on tax and transfer pricing.
2. For a discussion of the current situation as perceived by large multinational corporations, see Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing: Risk Reduction and Advance
Pricing Agreements, (Ernst & Young International Ltd. 1995) reprinted in 11 TAX
NOTES INT'L 293 (July 31, 1995) [hereinafter Ernst & Young, Transfer PricingJ.
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course, taxable income which is not taxed by any nation. Concurrently, the fragmentation of taxation of international transactions into a number of national systems provides a significant opportunity to business entities for tax avoidance, evasion, or mistake. 3
Transfer pricing, the price charged by one business entity
to another for the provision of goods, services, or intangibles,'
constitutes the easiest way for reallocating income and expenses between entities. 5 As part of their tax planning, many companies ·avail themselves of tax savings to be had by locating
their services, production, or other facilities in regions with
more favorable tax systems. 6 Companies also structure themselves in order to minimize worldwide taxation. 7 The line between tax planning and tax abuse is crossed when and if entities misuse transfer pricing. s This occurs when the pricing of
3. See Charles F. Connolly, Comment, The New Transfer Pricing and Penalty
Regulations: Increased Compliance, Increased Burdens, and the Search for a Safe
Harbor, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 339, 340 (1995).
4. TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION ISSUES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
REPORT ON TRANSFER PRICING AND TAX COMPLIANCE OF FOREIGN AND U.S.-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS 1 (Apr. 13, 1995), reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No.
92 at L-1 (May 12, 1995) [hereinafter TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION ISSUES].
5. See Susan C. Borkowski, Advance Pricing (Dis)Agreements: Differences in
Tax Authority and Transnational Corporation Opinions, 22 INT'L TAX J. 23 (1996).
6. For a discussion of this form of planning, "tax arbitrage," as an opportunity created by the nation-state taxing multinational businesses, see Walter F.
O'Connor, Editor's Note, 22 INT'L TAX J. iii, iv (1996) (including examples such as
hybrid company structures, cross-border leasing and licensing, and structuring
products to gain different treatment in different states). For a brief review of an
international meeting of tax lawyers discussing, contrasting, and developing models
of transactions designed to benefit from international tax arbitrage, see International Financial Transactions, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 1589 (May 20, 1996).
7. These structures are numerous and are often hybrid in order to fit under
one country's definition of a particular structure while avoiding that of another or
taking advantage of particular structurally-based tax advantages. An example of
this is the commissionaire distribution structure wherein the local distribution
subsidiary does not buy and resell goods, but sells goods in its own name on behalf of the foreign supplier as an undisclosed principal. The primary transfer pricing issue in this structure is the appropriateness of the commission paid the
commissionaire, which is much simpler to compare and justify, leaving much more
flexibility as to pricing strategies. See Martin R. McClintock & Stephen A. Ward,
International Tax and Business Planning Opportunities Through Commissionaire
Arrangements, 22 INT'L TAX J. 55 (1996) (describing the commissionaire structure,
its objectives, advantages, and disadvantages).
8. The following is an example of potential tax problems arising from improper transfer pricing between two fictitious, related companies. NipponSoft Multinational, headquartered in Osaka, Japan, develops and sells its patented and copy-
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goods, services, intangibles, or other elements is artificially
increased or decreased in order to shift income and/or expenses
between entities for tax reasons. 9 The difficulties inherent in
the taxation of income shifted through transfer pricing are
receiving increased attention at both the national and international levels,lO and constitute the most significant tax issue
for multinational corporations today.ll
This article will examine the significance of transfer pricing. Further, it will review, as an example, the current national and international systems and procedures for identifying
and capturing tax lost due to inaccurate transfer pricing used
by two countries: the United States, as the originator and
developer of much of the transfer pricing methodology, and
Japan, one of the countries most actively involved in the regulation of transfer pricing and also a major trading partner of
righted software in Japan and worldwide. Transfer pricing to unrelated distributors provides NipponSoft with a gross profit of 67%. NipponSoft, U.S.A., a fullyowned subsidiary located in San Jose, California, sells and services its parent's
software exclusively in the U.S .. Intercompany pricing is cost plus 20% profit. This
subsidiary's net profits in 1996 exceeded the parent's company's unconsolidated
earnings. Assume that the Japanese corporate tax rate is higher than the comparable U.S. rate.
9. See TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION ISSUES, supra note 4. The definition
of abusive transfer pricing practice used in United States tax treaties describes
the practice as it would differ from pricing between unrelated parties:
Where a resident of a Contracting State and any other
person are related and where such related persons make
arrangements or impose conditions between themselves
which are different from those which would be made
between independent persons, then any income, deductions, credits, or allowances which would, but for those
arrangements or conditions, have been taken int!l account
in computing the income (or loss) of, or the tax payable
by, one of such persons, may be allocated and utilized in
computing the amount of the income subject to tax and
the taxes payable by such resident of that Contracting
State.
Convention between the United States of America and Japan for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion Respect to Taxes on Income,
Mar. 8, 1971, U.S."Japan, art. 11, para. 1, U.S.T. 969, 1004 (1972) [hereinafter
U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty].
10. See, e.g., Announcement 95-2, 1995-2, I.R.B. 59 (transfer pricing as main
focus of IRS international examination activity and innovative methods for increasing voluntary compliance) [hereinafter Announcement 95-21.
11. See Ernst & Young LLP, Ernst & Young 1995 Transfer Pricing Documentation Survey, (Ernst & Young International Ltd. 1996), reprinted in 13 TAX NOTES
INT'L 204 (July 15, 1996); see also Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2.
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the United States. It will include a brief analysis of current
issues and possible solutions to transfer pricing.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRANSFER PRICING
ISSUE
Business, for better or for worse, comprises the most potent force for change in the world today. The impact of business is felt, not only economically, but also in the realms of
science, education, politics, social mores, and culture, as well
as within almost every other realm of our global society. Business has become the lifeblood and the changing force in the
world and the patterns and dynamics of business drive development in all realms of daily life.
As the world economy is currently structured, potential tax
consequences are a major factor in most business decisions,
often the deciding factor. Tax policy also comprises a potent
force in politics, economics, and environmental management,
both within and between nations. Governments, politicians,
business entities, lobbyists, and numerous others aspire to and
succeed in shaping tax policy in order to support their particular goals. Nations use tax policy not only to raise revenues, but
also to encourage and enforce national goals, ambitions, policies, and priorities. Many governments are creating incentives
and placing pressures on firms and industries to internationalize. I2 For example, in order to develop self-sufficiency or a
stronger economic base, many countries offer incentives to
businesses to position parts of their manufacturing or services
in specific countries and regions. I3
Although taxation can serve in the achievement of political, developmental, and environmental goals, among others,
the basic purpose of taxation is to generate revenue to contribute to the costs of maintaining the state. Traditionally, taxation has been based on a theory of territoriality, taxing income

12. See Peter F. Cowhey & Jonathan D. Aronson, A New Trade Order, 72
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 183 (1993).

13. See Jeffrey E. Garten, Is America Abandoning Multilateral Trade?, 74 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 50, 57-58 (1995) (discussing increasing U.S. and other nations' expanding government support for firms).
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in the territory in which it is earned by the governing state's
tax administration.
Increasingly, the geographic OrIgm of income is not only
difficult or impossible to determine, but also it is no longer
necessarily a valid basis for taxation. 14 Even in cases where it
makes sense to levy tax based on the nation or territory where
the income is earned, this demarcation becomes very difficult
to ascertain when several locations are involved in the income
generating process or product. Businesses are becoming increasingly integrated in order to achieve economies of scale,
profit and product diversification, market penetration, complementary product production, and other business goalS. 15 This
integration takes place vertically 16 and horizontally as well as
through formal and informal alliances inside and outside of
specific industries and geographically, both domestically and
internationally. 17 Transnational corporations extend beyond
national borders, are subject to the laws of more than one
nation, and are increasingly recognized as international entities requiring not only international legal regulation, but also
possible recognition as international legal persons. 18
Technological advances enable some enterprises to conduct
business multinationally without leaving the home office or

14. For a specific example, see Andrew M. Snyder, Note, Taxation of Global
Trading Operations: Use of Advance Pricing Agreements and Profit·Split Methodol·
ogy, 48 TAX LAw. 1057 (1995).
15. See, e.g., Cowhey & Aronson, supra note 11 (asserting that, despite government intervention, the world market is more thoroughly integrated than 20 years
ago, and using the automobile industry as a specific example).
16. For an explanation of how - due to the nature of their transactions vertically integrated multinationals differ so greatly in their functions, contractual
terms, risks, markets, and products for the uncontrolled transactions (that the
Regulations require to be used as a basis to determine an arm's length price) that it is unlikely that other transactions could be adjusted to be presented to the
Service as sufficiently comparable transactions to justify the taxpayer's pricing, see
Henry J. Birnkrant & James E. Croker, Jr., Transfer Pricing Final Regs. Increase
Flexibility, But Not Certainty in Choice of Method, 81 J. TAX'N 268, 273 (1994).
17. For clear analysis and explanation of the semiconductor industry, computer
industry, automobile industry, and telecommunications services as examples of this
new economic order, see Cowhey & Aronson, supra note 11, at 185-191.
18. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw 171-172 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing the increased attention and practice in international law regarding the
rights and duties of transnational corporations and the possibility that the latter
could thereby be regarded as international persons).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

5

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 3 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 9

198

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L. & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 3:1

sometimes even the home. 19 The growth of technology; particularly communication, is making the world a smaller place at
an incredibly quick pace. With the rapid development of the
Internet, the location of a given sale or service becomes difficult, if not impossible, to place. 20 It is increasingly hard to
determine where something is produced, designed, created,
adjusted, or somehow had value added.21
As a greater proportion of taxable business income is de-

rived from transactions which are international in nature, the
significance and impact of the systems and procedures for this
taxation evolve. 22 The appropriate taxation of international
business transactions, by its definition and nature, requires
comprehension of the international systems within which the
transactions occur. The direction applied to international business by taxation impacts the development, stability, and health
of the world economy in profound and fundamental ways, due
not only to fluctuations in tax revenues, but also to the myriad
other effects of tax policy.
The tax authorities of a number of nations, including the
United States, are increasing their review of transfer pricing
practices ,23 particularly internationally within and between
19. For an industry-specific discussion of global trading operations and the
difficulty of associating each business transaction with exact geographical locations
for transfer pricing purposes, see Snyder, supra note 13. (Global trading operations
are an excellent example of an industry which is not based on geographic location
of the taxpayer or transaction and therefore is extremely vulnerable to double
taxation, but not fitting well within the paradigms of transfer pricing regulations.)
20. O'Connor, supra note 6, at v.
21. See Jeffrey E. Garten, American Trade Law in a Changing World Economy, 29 INT'L LAw. 15, 22 (1995); see also O'Connor, supra note 6, at iv. For a
description of the issues the Treasury Department is currently studying for its
forthcoming paper on how to tax electronic commerce, acknowledging that it does
not fit within the current parameters for transfer pricing regulation, such as permanent establishments, see Treasury Paper Will Examine § 482 Issues Affecting
Electronic Online Transactions, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 109 (July 3, 1996) (quoting Bruce Cohen, attorney adviser in U.S. Treasury's International Tax Counsel's
office: "Could a computer server be a permanent establishment? Are there any
circumstances under which a [World Wide Web] page that takes orders [could] be
a permanent establishment?")
22. See Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 293-294 (describing
the current systems and procedures as comprising a "global tax war" with the
U.S. having made "the declaration of war"); cf Garten, supra note 12 (discussing
in this article the importance and definition of the right kind of multilateralism).
23. See, e.g., Prepared Remarks by Commissioner of Internal Revenue Margaret
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multinational corporations. This heightened scrutiny is not
surprising since it is estimated that nearly half of all trade
among advanced nations takes place between related parties. 24 The amount of potential tax revenue involved in inaccurate transfer pricing is large25 and increasing,26 and leads to
the likely conclusion that national tax authorities' efforts to
pursue that revenue will also continue to increase. 27

Milner Richardson at Institute on Current Issues in International Tax, Dec. 14,
1995, 241 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at L-4, L-5 (Apr. 30, 1996). [hereinafter Prepared
Remarks by Commissioner] (reaffirming the Service's commitment to transfer pricing and base erosion as the first of five areas in its international compliance plan
and discussing progress); see also Study Shows Authorities Aggressively Questioning
Practices of Multinationals, 137 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at G-2 (July 18, 1995) (citing a survey of 210 multinational corporations based in the U.S., U.K, Australia,
France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands); Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing,
supra note 2, at 295 (stating that the activities most susceptible to transfer pricing disputes are: charges for administrative or managerial services, royalties for
intangible rights, and transfers of finished goods for resale).
24. Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2.
25. See Study Says Pricing Abuse Cost $33 Billion in Lost Revenue in 1993, 2
TRANSFER PRICING (BNA) at 788 (1994) (study indicating that transfer pricing
abuses cost the U.S. $33 billion in tax revenue in 1993). Transfer pricing has been
the basis for approximately 75% of I.R.S. adjustments to multinational
corporations' income in recent years. See Marc M. Levey et aI., Transfer Pricing:
Alternative Practical Strategies, 890 T.M. § 7:1 (1996) [hereinafter Levey et aI.,
Transfer Pricing].
26. See, e.g., Unagreed Transfer Pricing Adjustments Totaled $911 Million FY
1995, IRS Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 19 at G-2 (Jan. 30, 1996) ("IRS . . .
reported that taxpayers agreed to $727 million in transfer pricing adjustments
during fiscal 1995, compared to $566 million in fiscal 1994. This represents a 28
percent increase over the previous fiscal year. Total Section 482 adjustments in
large cases totaled $1.64 billion in fiscal 1995, compared to $1.2 billion in fiscal
1994 - a 39% increase over fiscal 1994 . . . . n) [hereinafter Unagreed Transfer Pricing Adjustments).
27. See, e.g., Prepared Remarks by Commissioner, supra note 22, at L-5; see
also Survey of Multinational Companies Finds Majority Subject to Transfer Pricing
Inquiries, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 163 (July 19, 1995) (quoting Michael Patton,
chairman of Ernst & Young's International Transfer Pricing Task Force: "In the
midst of the current global investment boom, national revenue authorities are
scrutinizing transfer pricing practices more closely, introducing added uncertainties
and risks into investment planning.").

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

7

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 3 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 9

200

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L. & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 3:1

III. CURRENT SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING TRANSFER PRICING ISSUES
A. BACKGROUND
The body of tax law governing transfer pricing developed
by the United States has influenced regulation of this type of
pricing in other nations. 28 The concept of transfer pricing, as
developed by the United States and currently the internationally predominant theory,29 is that transfer pricing between
entities should always reflect an "arm's length" price,30 the
price which unrelated and uninterested entities would charge
each other; this arm's length price should be charged even if
the entities are somehow related or otherwise share mutual
interests. The purpose of arm's length pricing is to ensure that
the profit margin falls within the geographical territory to
which it is attributable and can be taxed by that state.
Although taxation still falls within the sovereign power of
each nation, recognition of the need for international cooperation and compatible standards has led to the development of
international models, definitions, and a vast network of bilateral treaties. Effective and non-duplicative taxation in a situation involving transfer pricing between entities subject to varied national taxing regimes requires those nations to interact
and to understand each other's systems. This article includes a
brief examination of how the United States and Japan have
addressed transfer pricing within and between their tax administrations. These two countries serve as solid examples as
they have developed transfer pricing regimes, are major trading partners, and have signed a bilateral tax treaty.31 Both
Japan and the United States are actively developing their

28. See Sven-Olof Lodin, Is the American Approach Fair? - Some Critical Views
on the Transfer Pricing Issues, 5 INTERTAX 240 (1995) (explaining the influence of
U.S. regulations to § 482 prior to 1992 on OECD, its member countries, as well as
other countries); see also Connolly, supra note 3, at 340.
29. See Leslie B. Samuels, Remarks on Revenue Estimating and the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guideline, 2 INTERTAX 64, 68 (1995) (written version of speech
given by Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Treasury).
30. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482·l(b)(I) (1996).
31. U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, supra note 8.
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transfer pricing administrations and are extensively involved
in the development of international guidelines. 32

B. UNITED STATES TRANSFER PRICING REGULATION
The United States regulates transfer pricing for both domestic and international transactions under the same overall
law. Under Section 482 (hereinafter § 482) of the Internal
Revenue Code, the Secretary of the Treasury is granted extensive power to make appropriate adjustments to an entity's
reported income, expenses, credits, allowances, and so on, in
reference to transactions of tangibles or intangibles, in order to
prevent evasion of taxes or to more accurately reflect real income. 33 Administration of such a broad-sweeping section necessitates guidelines, standards, procedures, and systems. The
major focus on implementation of § 482 began after the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, wherein Congress focused on the inadequacy of the administration of this section, particularly in the
transfer of intangibles. 34 Section 482 was modified to require
32. The United States and Japan have been involved in the development and
implementation of the DECO transfer pricing work. Additionally, Japan and the
United States are both members of the Pacific Association of Tax Administrators
[hereinafter PATA], as are Australia and Canada. PATA members agreed upon
expedited exchange of information guidelines in order to facilitate tax examinations
and broad procedural guidelines in order to facilitate the competent authority
portion of obtaining bilateral APAs. See Toshio Miyatake, Transfer Pricing in Japan, 2 THE TAX TREATMENT OF TRANSFER PRICING, Japan 1, Japan 51 (lnt'l Bureau of Fisc. Doc. ed. 1995); see also Sources Say At Least Two Japanese Banks
Seeking Bilateral APAs with United States, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 204 (Aug. 2,
1995) [hereinafter Japanese Banks Seeking Bilateral APAs].
33. In this regard I.R.C. § 482 (1996) provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated)
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses,
if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or
allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of
taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses. In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property (within the meaning
of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such
transfer or license shall be commensurate with the income
attributable to the intangible.
34. Bobbe Hirsh et aI., Final Transfer Pricing Regulations Restate Arm's
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that pricing for intangible property via a controlled transaction
be commensurate with income produced by that property.3S
The Treasury Department produced a study in 1988, popularly
known as the "White Paper," in response to Congressional
concerns regarding the need for and possibilities of more thorough administration of transfer pricing. 3s The White Paper
reinforced and accentuated the need for a more effective and
efficient system to collect the tax revenue lost due to transfer
pricing practices. 37
Since the White Paper, development of § 482 and the supporting regulations and procedures has been extensive and is
still underway.3s The U.S. regulations regarding transfer pricing abuse are considered to be the most aggressive. 39 Not only
have the regulations relating to this section become increas-

Length Principle, 72 TAXES 587, 587-588 (Oct. 1994).
35. "In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property (within the
meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible." I.R.C.
§ 482 (1996) (last sentence).
36. TREASURY DEP'T, A STUDY OF INTERCOMPANY PRICING UNDER SECTION 482
OF THE CODE (1988), reprinted in Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.Y. 458.
37. See id..
38. In 1994, the IRS released final § 482 regulations of general application,
and those for determining the transfer prices for related party transfers of tangible
property and intangible property. See T.D. 8552, 59 Fed. Reg. 34971 (1994). In
1995, transfer pricing regulations were issued for research and development cost
sharing. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7 (1996). One foreign tax specialist has critically
noted this burgeoning body of regulations:
The new regulations fill almost 150 pages and, including
already existing rules concerning transfer pricing, the
total number of pages of regulations aiming at developing
the principles laid down in the few sentences of IRC Section 482 amounts to approximately 250 . . . . [a]lthough
there are reasons to believe that this pile of rules and
formulas will only to a very limited extent improve the
possibilities to solve the transfer pricing issues in a fair
and satisfactory way.
Lodin, supra note 27.
39. See Todd Wolosoff, IRS Issues Final Transfer PriCing Penalty Regulations,
12 TAX NOTES INT'L 706 (Mar. 4, 1996); see also Steven P. Hannes et aI., Handling Controuersy and Planning Effectiuely Under the Final IRS Transfer Pricing
Penalty Regulations, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 671, 672-673 (Feb. 26, 1996) ("the taxpayer bears the heavy burden of proving in a tax audit that its transfer pricing
was 'correct,' and that an IRS-proposed pricing adjustment is 'wrong'") (citing
Altama Delta Corp. v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. No. 22 (1995); Seagate Tech., Inc. v.
Comm'r, 102 T.C. 149, 164 (1994); and Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Comm'r, 66 T.C.M.
(CCH) 634, 656-657 (1993).
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ingly detailed, but they are also now reinforced by contemporaneous documentation and disclosure rules, as well as significant penalty provisions for substantial misstatement of transfer prices.40
The officially stated purpose of section 482 is to ensure
that taxpayers clearly reflect income attributable to "controlled
transactions," and to prevent the avoidance of taxes with respect to such transactions. 41 The existence of control is not a
bright line, but is based on an examination of facts and circumstances, along with subjective assessment. The definition
of "controlled" in the regulations is that it: "includes any kind
of control, direct or indirect, whether legally enforceable, and
however exercisable or exercised. It is the reality of the control
which is decisive, not its form or the mode of its exercise. A
presumption of control arises if income or deductions have been
arbitrarily shifted."42
Section 482 attempts to place a controlled taxpayer on a
tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer, the "arm's length
standard," which entails determining the true taxable income
by what the results of the transaction would have been if undertaken by uncontrolled taxpayers under the same circumstances. 43 The determination of whether or not a transaction
is controlled and which income is attributable to which part of
a transactions is, unlike the simplicity of the goal, a gargantuan task and, often, if not always, virtually impossible to
accomplish with precision. 44

40. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662 (1996); see also Marc M. Levey et aI., Final 482 Regs.
Aim At More Flexibility But Retain IRS Audit Focus, 5 J. INT'L TAX'N 456 (1994)
[hereinafter Levey et aI., Final 482 Regs.] ("armed with mountains of contempora·
neous documentation required . . . taxpayers can be assured that the IRS will conduct audits of controlled-party transactions with unprecedented detail and zeal and
that they truly will be required to meet their heavy burden of proof.").
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(1) (1996).
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-IA(a)(3) (emphasis added).
43. See Treas. Reg. § 1.4B2-1(b)(1).
44. The number of articles, books, and seminars produced, as well as the assortment of accounting firms, attorneys, and other specialists who make their
living in this means is phenomenal. An entire article could be written cataloguing
and comparing the sources of assistance in this regard. As an exhaustive list is
beyond the scope of this article; several helpful articles are noted. See D. Kevin
Dolan et aI., Final Transfer Pricing Regulations, 23 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 423
(1994); see also Laurent P. Guerard, Selecting the Best Method: A Primer, 4 Trans-
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The current regulations require that the transfer pricing
method selected confirm or determine what the transfer price
would be in an arm's length transaction and must follow the
"best method rule."45 These provide the following methods for
ascertaining the arm's length result in transactions based on
the transfer of tangible property: comparable uncontrolled
price, resale price, cost plus, comparable profit, profit split, and
unspecified methods. 46 The best method is the one which provides the most reliable measure of an arm's length result given
the specific set of circumstances and considering the completeness and accuracy of the data and the degree of comparability between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions. 47
More than one method may be appropriate and there may be
several possible applications. 48
Although pricing decisions are made for a myriad of reasons other than immediate maximization of profit, the regulations governing the application of § 482 do not include many
ways to justify a deviation from the arm's length standard. 49
For example, justifying pricing as a market strategy is limited
to situations when the taxpayer is entering a new market and
trying to establish a market share, and then only if the strate-

fer Pricing, Special Report No. 18 (BNA) at 1 (Oct. 18, 1995); Marc M. Levey &
Cym H. Lowell, Transfer Pricing Exam Strategy Evolves To A New Standard, 6 J.
INT'L TAX'N 504 (1995); Daniel S. Levy et aI., Economics and the New Transfer
Pricing Regulations: Achieving Arm's Length Through the Invisible Hand, 4 Transfer Pricing, Special Report No. 17 (BNA) at 1 (May 24, 1995); John P. Warner,
General Principles of Transfer Pricing Under the Final Revised Transfer Pricing
Rules, 36 TAX MGMT. MEMORANDUM 35 (1995); John P. Warner, Transfer Pricing
Under the Final Revised Transfer Pricing Rules, 36 TAX MGMT. MEMORANDUM 51
(1995).
45. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c).
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(a) (1996). For a thorough description of these methods and their application, see Guerard, supra note 43, at 1. For the examples
developed by the IRS, see examples given within the text of Treas. Reg. §§ 1.4821-1.482-8.
47. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(2). However, the taxpayer must maintain documentation to establish that the method used provides the "most accurate" measure
of an arm's length result. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii)(A), (C) (1996).
48. See Levey et aI., supra note 39, at 457.
49. For a discussion of parent-survival premium as potential deviation from
arm's length standard, with a specific analysis of National Semiconductor Corp.,
see Marc M. Levey & Gregg A. Grauer, Recognizing 'Parent-Survival Premium' in
Transfer Pricing, 5 J. INT'L TAX 541 (1994).
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gy is comparable to that a similar company would pursue with-

in the industry. 50

'

The best method rule, although flexible in appearance,
requires significant time, expense, and risk to fulfill due to the
need to review all methods to determine the best and the
chance that the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter I.R.S. or
Service) may have a different opinion. 51 In order to gain the
most credibility and protection, the choice of method to be used
for a transfer pricing study should be based on the comparability and the quality of the data and assumptions. 52
Although access to information may be difficult or limited,
the taxpayer should strive to use the most comparable uncontrolled transactions available, as determined by the similarity
of: functions of the parties, contractual terms, assignment of
risks, economics, and property and services provided by either
party.53 The Service, taxpayers, and tax professionals have
asserted that public information and voluntarily shared data
are not sufficient for an investigation of transfer pricing cases. 54 Through its summons authority,55 however, the Service
has the power to acquire private business information to use
for third party comparables. 56 The dilemma for the taxpayer

50. See Levey et aI., supra note 39, at 458 (noting that, given a competitive
world, the information required to document this may be impossible to obtain); see
also Carlton M. Smith, Documentation Needed to Avoid Penalties Specified by
Transfer Pricing Temp. Regs, 80 J. TAX'N 304, 304-307 (1994) (note tone of article
following subtitle stating, in part, "IRS is essentially asking for an indexed audit
file.").
51. Levey et aI., Transfer Pricing, supra note 24, at §7: I.E.
52. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.6662(d)(2)(ii) (1996); see Levey et aI., supra note 39, at
457; see also Hannes et al., supra note 38, at 672-673 (explaining why a taxpayer
should at least document why it is reasonable to conclude that no further consideration of other methods is necessary).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-l(d)(3) (1994). See Levey et aI., Final 4B2 Regs., supra
note 39, at 457.
54. See Ryan J. Donmoyer et aI., IRS To Pursue More Third·Party
Comparables in Transfer Pricing Cases, 10 TAX NOTES INT'L 894 (Mar. 13, 1995).
For a discussion of the results of an IRS survey showing the inadequacy of the
third party comparable information available to the Service from public sources
and voluntarily shared information, see IRS Survey Results Reveal Inadequacy of
Third Party Information Data Sources, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at G-1 (Mar.
3, 1995).
55. I.R.C. § 7602 (1996).
56. See Donmoyer et aI., supra note 53, at 894 (quoting Margaret Richardson,
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is how to determine and acquire the highest quality data possible,57 given that the most comparable information would probably be that of the taxpayer's most direct competitors. 58 Once
a taxpayer has determined the information available on
comparables and the industry as a whole, the choice remains
as to which method most reliably reflects an arm's length price
given the specific circumstances of the transaction studied.
Transfer pricing studies can be done in-house or by an
outsider. 59 Whether or not to actually devote the resources for
documentation, either internally or externally, is a management decision, which may be based on potential penalty exposure. 60 In deciding whether or not to document, a taxpayer
should consider that extensive contemporaneous documentation created by the time of filing the return may provide the
taxpayer with protection from transfer pricing penalties. 61
Any documentation prepared must be carefully and thoroughly
analyzed and supportive of the taxpayer's position as the IRS

IRS Commissioner, affirming the Service's right to obtain third party comparable
information, explaining past practice as exercising "restraint," and noting that this
will change if necessary to get "the information we need to effectively administer
the transfer pricing regime."}.
57. For a thorough discussion of the importance of quality data, how to identify it, assess it, substantiate it, and make appropriate adjustments, see Marc M.
Levey et a!., Defining 'Quality' Data in a Transfer Pricing Analysis, 7 J. INT'L TAX
4 (1996).
58. See Levey et a!., Final 4B2 Regs., supra note 39, at 457.
59. See Taxpayers Should Not Rush into Studies for §6662 Purposes, Tax Executive Says, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 111 (July 3, 1996) [hereinafter Taxpayers
Should Not Rush into Studies for §6662 PurposesJ.
60. See id. at 111 (quoting Alan O. Dixler, Merck & Co.'s senior tax counsel).
61. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii) (1996). This documentation must include the following:
1. Overview of the taxpayer's business, including analysis of economic and
legal factors affecting the pricing;
2. Description of organization and of all related parties engaged in, directly
or indirectly, affecting pricing;
3. Documentation explicitly required by § 482 regulations;
4. Description of method and why selected;
5. Description of methods considered and why not selected;
6. Description of controlled transactions and internal data used to analyze
them;
7. Description of comparables used, determination of what is "comparable"
and adjustments made; and,
8. Explanation of economic analysis and projections relied upon in developing the method.
See Wolosoff, supra note 38, at 708.
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or a foreign tax authority can use the documentation provided
to construe and support an adjustment or penalty.62
Although transfer pricing issues are complex for tangible
products, transfer pricing issues in the areas of services and
intangibles are even more difficult to analyze. Transfer pricing
regulations for intangibles are a current priority for the Service as intangibles constitute a substantial and ever-increasing
factor in U.S. exports in recent years. 63 The current methods
available for determining an arm's length price are difficult to
apply to intangibles. For example, in the situation where reliable internal comparable intangibles exist, the comparable
uncontrolled transaction method can be used (and some insist
it must be used) to determine transfer prices for intangible
property.64 The other two specified methods for intangibles
are the comparable profits method and profit split method. 65
The proposed regulations for services were originally scheduled
to be completed during 1996, but the project was dropped midyear for unspecified reasons. 66
One uncertain area in regard to transfer pricing for intangibles has been the determination of ownership of an intangible, and, therefore, the appropriate allocations of and adjustments to income, expenses, and profit. Prior to 1994, the "developer," the party that created the intangible's economic value, was entitled to profit from the intangible. 67 The regulations now provide that determination of ownership of an intan-

62. See Hannes et aI., supra note 38, at 679-680 (discussing further on pp.
681-683 the advisability of initial information preparation under the attorney-client
privilege in order to determine direction and strategy).
63. Intellectual property exports were estimated at 12% in 1983 and 25% of
total U.S. exports in 1991. Jeffrey E. Garten, American Trade Law in a Changing
World Economy, 29 INT'L LAW. 15, 22 (1995) (citing Ralph Oman, Register of
Copyright). U.S. financial services exports in 1994 were more than $8 billion. See
Garten, supra note 12, at 57.
64. For a detailed analysis and examples of why and how the CUT method
must be used in this situation, see Richard P. Rozek, Applying the Best Method
Rule When Reliable Internal Comparable Intangibles Exist, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L
1191 (Apr. 18, 1996).
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4{a) (1996).
66. IRS Drops Project to Propose Rules for Pricing Related-Party Services in
1996, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 107, at G-3 (June 4, 1996).
67. See, Richard Boykin, Transfer Pricing Policy Issues: Who Is the Developer?,
12 TAX NOTES INT'L 279 (Jan. 22, 1996).
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gible begins with the legal owners of the right to exploit the
intangible. s8 In order to clarify pricing and expenses, the regulations now allow for the allocation of profits derived from an
intangible to be specified by the parties through the creation of
an appropriate research and development cost sharing arrangement. 69
C. TRANSFER PRICING ENFORCEMENT AND ISSUE RESOLUTION
IN THE UNITED STATES

1. Adjustments

Transfer pricing is a priority area of enforcement for the
IRS and the Treasury. 70 The adjustments emanating from
application of § 482 represent a growing potential source of tax
revenue. Although a lesser amount will eventually be realized
as revenue, the IRS had $911 million in unagreed adjustments
from large case examinations at the end of fiscal 1995; this
represented an increase of fifty percent over the $615 million
for fiscal 1994.71
2. Penalty Regulations
The United States' transfer pricing penalties constitute the
most severe of all countries. 72 Transfer pricing penalties are
made at two levels: the specific transactional level and the net
section 482 adjustment penalty for affiliated groups filing a
consolidated return. 73 The penalty thresholds are low enough
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(0 (1996).
69. In December 1995, the IRS finalized regulations dealing with research and
development cost-sharing. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7 (1996). For a deSCription and
analysis of the extensive documentation and comprehensive contract required under
the provisions of this regulation, see Hannes et aI., supra note 38, at 677-678.
70. Transfer pricing is the center focus of a program entitled 'Tax Compliance
in a Global Economy" jointly announced by the Treasury Department and the
Internal Revenue Service in 1994. See Samuels, supra note 28, at 65.
71. See Unagreed Transfer Pricing Adjustments, supra note 25, at G-2.
72. See WolosofT, supra note 38, at 706.
73. Under I.R.C. § 6662(e),(h) (1996) penalties include:
Transaction penalty for a valuation misstatement:
- 20% penalty for pricing which is either 200% or more than correct price
or 50% or less;
- 40% penalty for pricing which is 400% or more than correct price or 25%
or less;
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to be crossed easily by a taxpayer with a large volume of transnational transactions. 74 The penalties constitute a sufficient
financial burden that, for many taxpayers, avoiding them is as
important, if not more important, than avoiding double taxation. 75 Also, the penalty statute has already had the unintended, but appropriate, effect of causing some tax directors to embrace transfer pricing as a U.S. and foreign tax planning opportunity, not just a problem. 76
The Service may exclude a transfer pncmg adjustment
from penalty provisions if the pricing analysis is documented
as set forth in the regulations and if either the specified or
unspecified method requirement for establishing an arm's
length price is met. 77 If the documentation process is to serve
as an effective prophylactic against penalties, it should not
only be thorough, but also begun early.78 In order to serve as
an exception to penalties, the documentation requirements for
the specified method must: be met by documents created by
the time of filing for the given year, be furnished to the IRS
within thirty days of an IRS request, and include documentation setting forth the taxpayer's business, relationships, structure, and a thorough pricing analysis. 79 The extent and thor-

- 40% penalty for the failure to charge for transfer of any tangible or intangible property.
Net § 482 Adjustment Penalty:
- 20% penalty if net adjustment exceeds either $5 million or 10% of gross
receipts;
- 40% penalty if net adjustment exceeds either $20 million or 20% of gross
receipts.
For an overview see Wolosoff, supra note 38, at 709.
74. Note that an IRS adjustment of 1% on an amount over $5 million would
subject the entity to the 20% net adjustment penalty. See Birnkrant & Croker, Jr.,
supra note 15, at 268; see also Hannes et aI., supra note 38, at 672-673. The final
regulations do allow that if a proposed adjustment is small in relation to the
dollar amount of the controlled transaction to which it relates, this fact is relevant
in determining if a taxpayer made a reasonable effort to apply a specified or unspecified method. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(ii)(G) (1996).
75. See Bimkrant & Croker, Jr., supra note 15, at 268.
76. See Hannes et aI., supra note 38, at 672.
77. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d) (1996); see footnote 60, supra, for list of documentation required.
78. Cf Hannes et aI., supra note 38, at 671 (discussing specifically how tax
planning and documentation should be conducted to avoid penalty and adjustment
exposure).
79. See Wolosoff, supra note 38, at 708. The list of documents required is
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oughness of data research required in order to be safe are
considered to be a facts and circumstances test, but remain
nebulous. 80 The Appeals Division of the IRS is faced with a
heavy burden in cases subject to transfer pricing penalties due
to the extensive documentation which must be analyzed in the
re-calculation of the penalties and the assessment as to whether the documentation suffices to meet the regulations. 81

3. Advance Pricing Agreements
In order to alleviate the uncertainty, cost, and time spent
resolving transfer pricing disputes, the United States created
the advance pricing agreement process (hereinafter APA).82
This is one of several methods of alternative dispute resolution
initiated by the Service in order to increase voluntary compliance by taxpayers.83 APAs are agreements that for a fixed
term, the authority will accept an agreed transfer pricing
method used by a group. Such agreements are formal in nature
with fixed terms and limits; they are obtained through a process of formal inquiry and negotiation and based on statute. 84
The APA is the only way for the taxpayer to achieve pricing
certainty and penalty avoidance.
The costs of establishing an APA are large enough for both
the taxpayer and the participating tax bodies so that the costs
and benefits require careful consideration. An APA involves
three types of costs: internal time, consultants' fees, and governmental fees. 85 The taxpayer bears a very substantial cost

given in Treas. Reg. § 1.6662·6(d)(2)(iii)(B) (1996).
80. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662·6(d)(2)(ii)(B) (1996) ("the expense of additional
efforts to locate new data may be weighed against the likelihood of finding addi·
tional data that would improve the reliability of the results and the amount by
which any new data would change the taxpayer's taxable income."); see also IRS
Final Regulations, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 563, 564 (Feb. 19, 1996).
81. See IRS Appeals Division Studying How To Handle Transfer Pricing Penalties, Dougherty Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 195, at G-2 (Oct. 10, 1995). [hereinafter IRS Appeals Division Studying How To Handle Transfer Pricing Penaltiesl.
82. See Seymour Zwick & Theresa Dilvorth, Alternative Dispute Resolution or
Examination by IRS, TranSfer Pricing (BNA) at 455 (Dec. 13, 1995).
83. See m..
84. This reflects an international definition of APAs, used by Ernst & Young
for an international transfer pricing study. Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra
note 2, at 295.
85. See m. at 310.
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in terms of time and money in putting together the information required for an APA and negotiating it with the taxing authorities involved. 86 However, the analysis, planning, and documentation required to prepare an APA build on the work necessary to protect oneself from the penalty regulations in the
event of a transfer pricing controversy.87 Previously completed
APAs are not published or disclosed88 and do not serve as precedent. 89 In the United States, the sheer volume of information involved and the unique nature of each case create an
enormous work load for the IRS.90
The APA process is lauded by a number of the participants
as a solution to transfer pricing issues. Despite the cost, time,
and effort involved, a number of tax practitioners still believe
the APA process to be the most effective alternative dispute
resolution method for taxpayers to resolve transfer pricing
issues. 91 A number of multinational corporations also believe
that the APA process is of major benefit as it affords companies a greater level of certainty as to the tax implications of
their covered activities. 92 The number of APAs is actually
growing,93 although it is not certain that it will be possible for

86. See id..
87. See Hannes et aI., supra note 38, at 680.
88. See, e.g., IRS Asks Court to Dismiss BNA Lawsuit Seeking Disclosure of
APA Methodologies, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 83, at G-4 (Apr. 30, 1996).
89. However, a taxpayer may rely on a transfer pricing methodology developed
and applied in its own APA in post-APA years as "reasonable" in order to avoid
penalties. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(ii)(F) (1996).
90. See, e.g., Manhattan District Office Designates Two Officials To Handle
APA Requests, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 99 (June 21, 1995) (for the first time at
the district level, IRS designates two officials at Manhattan office to handle heavy
APA load).
91. See, e.g., Zwick & Dilvorth, supra note 81, at 459; see also Taxpayers
Should Not Rush into Studies for §6662 Purposes, supra note 58, at 111 (quoting
Alan O. Dixler, Merck & Co.'s senior tax counsel: "If you can mobilize the resources, then do an APA. It takes the transfer pricing issue off the table.").
92. See Snyder, supra note 13, at 1068-1069; see also Study Shows Authorities
Aggressively Questioning Practices of Multinationals, 137 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) G-2
(July 18, 1995) (citing a 64% of a survey of 210 multinational corporations based
in the U.S., U.K, Australia, France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands, as
stating that they would "likely" or "very likely" use APAs).
93. For example, government studies covering years past have indicated that
the number of completed APAs in March, 1993, was 9, and as of January, 1995,
was approximately 26. See supra TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION ISSUES, note 4,
at 7.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

19

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 3 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 9

212

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L. & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 3:1

it to grow to sufficient capacity for the rapidly increasing number of transactions with potential transfer pricing issues.
4. Mediation

In order to expedite transfer pncmg cases, the Service
decided to try mediation as a methodology for resolving transfer pricing issues between the taxpayer and the Service. 94 The
mediator is jointly selected by the parties, either from another
Appeals office or from outside of the Service,95 and some taxpayers are requesting and being allowed to have two mediators
handle a case, one from Appeals and one from outside the IRS;
each mediator hears the case separately.96
5. Hybrid: Concurrent Advance Pricing Agreement and Joint
Consideration of Pending Disputes

One successful program involves joint resolution of transfer pricing issues by Appeals and the u.s. Competent Authority.97 The Service is considering an alternative dispute resolution program which would allow a taxpayer to resolve potential
transfer pricing disputes and pending disputes on the Examination, Appeals, and docketed levels by requesting an APA
and, under the Simultaneous Appeals Process (SAP), joint
consideration of pending disputes. 98

94. See Announcement 95-2, supra note 9 (announcing a one year trial period
beginning October 30, 1995). All of June, 1996, three cases had been resolved
through this program; none involved § 482; see IRS Devising Way to Settle Docketed Cases Based on APAs, Appeals Settlement Terms, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at
109-110 (July 3, 1996) (reporting an address made by Thomas Louthan, director of
Appeals' Office of Dispute Resolution & Specialty Programs at a World Trade
Institute seminar) [hereinafter IRS Devising Way to Settle Docketed Cases].
95. See supra Announcement 95-2, note 9 (announcing a one year trial period
beginning October 30, 1995).
96. See IRS Devising Way to Settle Docketed Cases, supra note 93, at 110.
97. See IRS Appeals Division Studying How To Handle Transfer Pricing Penalties, supra note 80, at G-2.
98. See IRS Devising Way to Settle Docketed Cases, supra note 93, at 110.
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D. JAPANESE TRANSFER PRICING REGULATION

Japan's international transfer pricing rules are distinct
from its domestic rules to prevent tax avoidance via arbitrary
pricing. 99 Japanese international transfer pricing rules were
enacted and codified as Article 66-5 (later 66-4) of the Special
Taxation Measures Law (STML) on 28 March 1986, based on a
report by the Tax Commission in December of the previous
year on the extent of transfer pricing and the need for new tax
provisions. loo Although the drafters of the Japanese transfer
pricing rules studied the rules of a number of countries, including the United States, they chose to use the Model developed
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (hereinafter OECD Model)lOl as a basis for Japan's
transfer pricing legislation. lo2

In order to make an adjustment for transfer pricing, the
government must prove both that the transaction was conducted between a corporation subject to Japanese corporate tax and
its foreign related person, and that the price charged was not
an arm's length price. 103 In the event that a corporation's
transaction price in a transaction with a foreign related person 104 is not an arm's length price/05 it may be adjusted to
an arm's length price for the purpose of the computation of
corporation tax. lOS A sufficient relationship exists to investi99. The three traditional approaches under Japanese corporate tax law for
dealing with tax avoidance based on arbitrary pricing are: (1) by reference to the
definition of revenue, (2) through the use of the provisions governing donations,
and (3) the denial of acts or accounting of a family company. See Miyatake, supra
note 31, at Japan 13-16 (describing the use and effect of these three approaches).
100. See id. at Japan 16-17.
101. Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital, 1977, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [hereinafter Model Double Taxation Convention]. The OECD Model was revised in 1992 and again in 1995. Model
Tax Convention on Income and Capital, Sept. 1, 1992, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Tax Treaties (CCH) 'll 191, Tax Treaties (WGL)
'll 2001 [hereinafter Model Tax Convention on Income].
102. See Miyatake, supra note 31, at Japan 17.
103. The government has the burden of proof in transfer pricing taxation cases.
See id. at Japan 60.
104. Japan's international transfer pricing provisions apply only to transactions
conducted by an entity required to pay corporation tax in Japan with a foreign
related corporation. See id. at Japan 23.
105. See Business in Japan, 51 7th TAX MGMT. PORT. (BNA) II.B.6.b.(2) (1996)
[hereinafter Business in Japan].
106. See Miyatake, supra note 31, at Japan 17 (including those in force as of
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gate transfer pricing issues when one of two special relationships exist: either corporation directly or indirectly owns 50%
or more of the total issued shares of the other, or controls said
corporation "in substance."lo7 Control in substance means
that one corporation can basically determine all or a portion of
the business policies of the other corporation due to relationship(s) between the officers, employees, or corporations as a
whole. !Os
Japan has specifically adopted the concept and definition
of arm's length price as stated in the 1979 GECD Report on
Transfer Pricing, as well as emulates its methods for computing an arm's length price. 109 In Japan, an arm's length transaction price for the sale of tangible property is computed under
one of three methods: comparable price, normal reseller's profit, or cost plus normal supplier's profit. 11o The Japanese Ministry of Finance also plans to add an additional transfer pricing method approved by the OECD, the transactional net margin method (TNMM); under this method, profits are calculated
in light of typical profit margins of comparable, unaffiliated
taxpayers. III The tax office also has the flexibility to consider
costs and expenses of business, fixed assets used in the business, and other factors if one of the three primary methods
cannot be used to determine an arm's length transaction
price. 112
The determination of an arm's length transaction price for
transactions other than the sale of inventory is authorized

July 1994) (explaining the provisions of Art. 66-4, para. 1 of the Special Tax Measures Law).
107. See Boidman et al., Transfer Pricing Rules and Practice in Japan, TRANsFER PRICING: FOREIGN RULES AND PRACTICE OUTSIDE OF EUROPE, TAX MGMT.
PORT. (BNA) ch. 33, II.A3.c (1996); see also Miyatake, supra note 31, at Japan 1821 (including diagrams of how to determine 50% ownership in a chain of ownership).
108. See Boidman et al., supra note 106, at ch. 33, II.A3.c.2. (citing and explaining Special Taxation Measures Law Enforcement Order No. 43 of 1957 as
amended, article 39-12).
109. See Miyatake, supra note 31, at Japan 21.
110. See Business in Japan, supra note 104, at I1.B.6.h.(2).
111. Pre-Confirmation System To Be Made Law To Expedite Agreements, MoF
Officials Say, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 94 (June 16, 1996) [hereinafter Pre-Confirmation System To Be Made Law J.
112. Business in Japan, supra note 104, at II.B.6.h.(2).
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using methods "similar" to those used for tangible goods. U3
Additionally, a safe harbor exists for rental of Japanese real
estate to foreign affiliates, due to the high value of real estate
in Japan.1l4
E. TRANSFER PRICING ENFORCEMENT AND ISSUE RESOLUTION
IN JAPAN

1. Adjustments

The Commissioner of the National Tax Administration
(hereinafter NTA) has the ultimate authority to make transfer
pricing adjustments, but the actual adjustments are made by
examiners.u5 During its 1994 tax year, ending June, 1994,
the NTA issued 60 deficiency assessments, totaling 120 billion
yen, approximately $1.5 billion U.S .. us
2. Advance Pricing Agreements
The National Tax Administration initiated its Pre-Confirmation System (herinafter PCS) program, for unilateral advance agreements, in 1987.117 The application for a PCS requests disclosure and a thorough analysis of the transactions,
relationships, and justification of the selected transfer pricing
method. 118 Each PCS requires an economic study and may
113. See id..
114. An annual rental of 8% of the value of the real estate as appraised for
inheritance tax is acceptable. This appraisal is normally considered to be much
less than the fair market value. In order to avail itself of this safe harbor, the
rental must be confirmed with the tax office and is subject to revision when the
appraisal is reviewed, usually every 3 years. See id..
115. See Miyatake, supra note 31, at Japan 50.
116. NTA To Shift AFA Functions To Regional Bureaus, Sources Say, Transfer
Pricing (BNA) at 77 (June 7, 1995) [hereinafter NTA To Shift AFA Functions To
Regional Bureaus].
117. Japan, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 12 (Apr. 12, 1995) [hereinafter Japan,
Transfer Pricing].
118. Information is requested about:
- The taxpayer's foreign affiliate;
- The volume and value of related-party transactions;
- Terms and conditions of the transactions;
- Functions performed by the taxpayer;
- Market conditions; and
- An explanation of why the selected transfer pricing methodology is the
most reasonable.
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take two to three years to negotiate ,119 although the NTA is
trying to expedite the negotiation process. 120 Apple Computer
Japan Inc. and J.P. Morgan Inc.'s Japanese affiliate were the
first two foreign taxpayers to use Japan's Pre-Confirmation
System to receive prospective approval of transfer prices. 121
The NTA is steadily increasing the size and importance 122 of its transfer pricing function in response to the
need to develop transfer pricing policy, as well as the everincreasing numbers of transfer pricing cases 123 and requests
for advance pricing agreements.124 Out of ten Japanese multinational corporations which participated in an international
study of transfer pricing, seven view transfer pricing as the
most important international tax issue facing them; and, all
but one, expect the use of APAs to groW. 125 Six of the Japanese multinational corporations in the aforementioned study

See Japan, Transfer Pricing, supra note 116, at 12. The analysis given must include comparables and adjustments made for the study. Id ..
119. See id.; see also Pre-Confirmation System To Be Made Law, supra note
110, at 94 (practitioners estimating an average PCS agreement requires three
years of negotiation).
120. See, e.g., NTA To Shift AFA Functions To Regional Bureaus, supra note
115, at 77; see also J.P. Morgan Concludes Bilateral APA with IRS, NTA, Sources
Say, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 367 (Nov. 1, 1995) (indicating that J.P. Morgan
bilateral APA was approved by Japan's National Tax Administration approximately
one year after filing request) [hereinafter J.P. Morgan Concludes Bilateral APA].
121. See J.P. Morgan Concludes Bilateral APA, supra note 119, at 367.
122. The Japanese government plans to write a law as basis for the Pre-Confirmation System, rather than the current NTA notice, in order to gain it more
respect, thereby increasing usage of it and expediting processing of PCS agreements. See Pre-Confirmation System To Be Made Law, supra note 110, at 94.
123. See NTA To Shift APA Functions To Regional Bureaus, supra note 115, at
77 (reporting that NTA issued 60 deficiency assessments in 1994 tax year and
anticipated 80 for its 1995 tax year).
124. See, e.g., NTA Says 25 Examiner Jobs To Be Created; New Divisions in
Kanto Plains, Tokyo Planned, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 70 (June 5, 1996); see
also NTA to Increase Transfer Pricing Staff by 17 in Regional Bureaus, Officials
Say, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 99, at G-2 (May 22, 1996) (indicating also a status
upgrade of office handling, competent authority issues to a division, and creation
of new levels of hierarchy within existing transfer pricing administrative structure); NTA To Shift AFA Functions To Regional Bureaus, supra note 115, at 77
(stating that shift is due to substantial increase in number of APA applications
and will include corresponding increase in transfer pricing personnel); Pre-Confirmation System To Be Made Law, supra note 110, at 94 (estimating 20 applications
for pes agreements pending from Japanese and foreign taxpayers as of June,
1996).
125. Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 297.
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have faced transfer pricing inquiries in countries in which they
have subsidiaries; four of them also faced such inquiries in
Japan. 126
IV. INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN TRANSFER
PRICING ADMINISTRATION
The internationalization of legal regulation of multinational businesses is accelerating as countries attempt to keep pace
with the globalization of the world business community. 127
Although taxation is considered a sovereign domain of the
nation-state, there is actual and potential conflict and overlap
between international law and the tax laws of individual nations. The bilateral tax treaties and national tax laws may not
accord with each other, or with the provisions and detail of the
increasing number of treaties and other international law
governing international trade and business, including: GATI,
WTO, EEC, NAFTA, ASEAN, APEC, OECD, and others.
Resolution of overlaps and conflicts in the area of taxation
in general and transfer pricing in particular is currently being
addressed through a series of bilateral tax treaties as well as
the work of international organizations to develop conventions,
models, guidelines, and practices. This body of international
work and cooperation is necessary not only to address areas of
overlap or conflict between tax regimes, but also because the
effective and efficient enforcement of taxation of multinational
businesses requires multinational enforcement and cooperation. 128
A. BILATERAL TAX TREATIES

Many nations have adopted bilateral tax treaties to prevent tax evasion and double taxation. 129 International model
tax treaties have been developed by the United Nations and
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development

.

126. [d ..
127. See Lance C. Tyson, Unitary Apportioning: A Key to Global Tax Harmony,
22 INT'L TAX'N J. 35 (1996).
128. See O'Connor, supra, note 6, at iv.
129. See, Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 294.
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(hereinafter OECD).130 Japan and the United States are parties to a bilateral tax treaty (hereinafter U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty).l31 Japan has concluded at least 45 income tax
treaties,132 while the United States is a party to more than
fifty-seven bilateral income tax treaties. 133
The U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, like the vast majority of tax
treaties, contains a "competent authority" or "mutual agreement" provision, authorizing the competent authority of each
country to meet to resolve issues of misapplication or double
taxation under the pertinent treaty. 134 The competent authority for Japan is comprised of the Deputy Commissioner,
International, and the Director, Office of International Operations/ 3s for the United States it is the Secretary of the Treasury.13S The competent authority provisions also generally
grant a residene 37 of a contracting state the right to request
the competent authority of that state to initiate proceedings in
the case of double taxation or taxation which the taxpayer believes to conflict with the treaty.13B
The issue of transfer pricing as it is defined involves a
tension between the taxing authorities/interest of nations and
the business(es) involved, which is particularly evident in the
competent authority process, both in the United States and in
Japan. The right to request competent authority assistance is
not the right to receive such assistance. 139 The use of compe130. See Model Double Taxation Convention, supra note 100.
131. See US-Japan Tax Treaty, supra note 8.
132. See Miyatake, supra note 31, at Japan 11-12 (including those in force as of
July, 1994).
133. As of April, 1995, the United States had entered into 57 income tax treaties. All but two of these (with Bermuda and Ireland) contain a provision whereby
the competent authority of each country can meet to resolve issues of double taxation or inappropriate application of the terms of the treaty. See John Venuti et al.,
Requesting' Competent Authority Assistance: IRS Proposes New Procedure, 24 TAX
MGMT. INT'L J. 229 (1995).
134. See Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 294.
135. See Boidman et al., supra note 106, at ch. 33.
136. It is delegated to the Assistant Commissioner (International) of the Internal Revenue Service. Delegation Order No. 114 (Rev. 9) § 1, 1990-2 C.B. 326. For
a thorough discussion of competent authority and usage, see Paul C. Rooney &
Nelson Suit, Competent Authority, 49 TAX LAw. 675 (1996).
137. A resident in this sense includes either a natural person or a legal person,
such as a corporation.
138. See Rooney & Suit, supra note 135, at 675.
139. For example, in the United States, if a taxpayer reaches a final settlement
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tent authority to resolve issues of taxation between the state of
the competent authority and another state or states can and
often does create a situation of conflict of interest for the competent authority.140
In the United States, the competent authority has the
discretion to initiate, continue, refuse, or terminate assistance
without the consent or knowledge of the affected taxpayer, the
entity requesting assistance, and without resolving the original
issue(s).141 In fact, under the terms of the tax treaties, the
U.S. competent authority has broad discretion and may even
reach an agreement with a treaty partner on a basis inconsistent with U.S. tax laws or regulations. 142
In the Japanese system, the competent authority procedure exists only due to treaty, and any domestic laws incorporating competent authority provisions merely implement the
treaty-related powers. 143 No provisions exist under current
law or regulations for unilateral adjustments in Japan solely to
prevent double taxation. 144 Therefore, in a double taxation
situation, absent mutual agreement between competent authorities of Japan and a treaty partner, it is unlikely that a
taxpayer would receive unilateral relief from the Japanese
authorities. 145

with the I.R.S. field or Appeals on a potential competent authority issue, the competent authority will not change the agreement if a corresponding adjustment
cannot be reached with the competent authority of the treaty party. See Rev. Proc.
96-13, 1996-3 I.R.B. 31; see also Hannes et aI., supra note 38, at 680 (explaining
that the taxpayer must be strategic in sequencing pursuit of relief).
140. See Rooney & Suit, supra note 135, at 676.
141. See Venuti et aI., supra note 132, at 230.
142. See id. at 230. The competent authorities can reach agreement on adjustment without agreement on methodology; see Donmoyer et aI., supra note 53, at
894 (reporting a statement of Frank Y. Ng, Director of the IRS Tax Treaty Division).
1,43. For a clear explanation of the extent and sources of power of competent
authorities in Japan, as well as procedural aspects and considerations for filing for
competent authority relief, see Boidman et aI., supra note 106, at ch. 33.
144. See id. at ch. 33, V.A..
145. See id.. (citing as the authoritative source for this contention); HAYUKA, M.,
lTEN KAKAKu ZEISEI SHOUKAI [A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE TRANSFER PRICING TAX SYSTEM) 97 (Okura Saimu Kyokai, 1991).
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In a recent survey, more than half of all U.S. multnational
corporations responding consider the competent authority procedure unsatisfactory; for Japanese multinational corporations,
slightly less than one-third found the competent authority
procedure wanting. l46 The major reasons given for dissatisfaction regarded the length of time involved in the process and
the fact that, at the end, there is no guarantee that an agreement will be reached.147 Nevertheless, both U.S. and foreign
competent authorities are requiring even more extensive documentation from taxpayers if they want relief from double taxation. l48 However, the IRS and the NTA have specifically
sought to expedite double taxation relief by developing a process to allow U.S. taxpayers being audited in Japan to apply
immediately to the U.S. competent authority, which could in
turn initiate talks with the Japanese competent authority.149
B. INTERNATIONAL USE OF ADVANCE PRICING AGREEMENTS

Advance Pricing Agreements provide a means for business
entities to reach a formal agreement with the competent authorities of the states having potential tax jurisdiction over a
given set of transactions. According to revenue authorities from
countries having some form of APA process, potential benefits
to multinational corporations include: bringing more certainty
and predictability to tax treatment of transfer pricing situations, limiting costs and time spent in examination, and reducing the possibility of litigation. 150 Benefits of APAs to the authorities, according to them, included: a better understanding
of a multinational corporation's business, increased certainty
that the correct amount of tax is paid, and a better working
relationship between tax authorities of different nations. 151

146. Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 303.
147. Id. at 304.
148. See, e.g., Competent Authorities Warning Taxpayers To Provide More Extensive Documentation, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 124 (July 3, 1996).
149. This could allow resolution of double taxation issues prior to deficiencies
being paid. See U.S.-Japan Process Would Allow Relief For Taxpayers Under Japanese Audit, ACI Says, Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 99 (June 21, 1995).
150. Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 295. For a discussion of
APAs in the United States, see supra Section III.B.3 ..
151. See Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 295.
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In order for APAs to be feasible internationally, both the
business entities and the competent authorities of the states
involved must be able to understand and bridge the taxation
differences between the respective systems. Japan and the
United States are both members of the Pacific Association of
Tax Administrators (hereinafter PATA).152 The PATA has
taken a number of steps in order to facilitate the handling of
tax matters between and among the member states. PATA
members agreed upon expedited exchange of information
guidelines in order to facilitate tax examinations. 153 PATA
developed and instituted broad procedural guidelines in order
to facilitate the competent authority portion of obtaining bilateral APAs. 154 The members have continued coordination of
their APA systems in order to better coordinate and handle the
increasing number of APA applications. 155
Usage of APAs by multinational business entities has
increased dramatically in the past ten years, and many multinational corporations expect the use of APAs to increase further. 156 In fact, the majority of advance pricing agreements
currently approved by the IRS are bilateral or multilateral
agreements involving the IRS and the tax authority of one or
more foreign governments. 157 A number of Japanese firms are
actively pursuing APAs with the IRS.158

152. The other members are Australia and Canada.
153. See Miyatake, supra note 31, at Japan 51.
154. See Japanese Banks Seeking Bilateral APAs, supra note 31, at 204; see
also Julianne MacKinnon, IFA's U.S. Branch Considers Recent Worldwide APA
Development, 9 TAX NOTES INT'L 1815 (Dec. 12, 1994) (indicating that, as of that
date, the U.S. had reached agreement with Canada, Australia, and Japan).
155. See Pacific Rim Tax Administrations Discuss Transfer Pricing Issues,
Transfer Pricing (BNA) at 346 (Oct. 18, 1995); see also Bilateral Advance Pricing
Agreements, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 1589 (May 20, 1996) [hereinafter Bilateral Advance Pricing Agreements] (citing speech of Michael Durst, director of the U.S.
APA program; noting also total of 125 completed APAs in U.S. as of May, 1996).
156. In an international study of multinational corporations: 81% expected the
use of APAs to increase, and almost 50% believed that they would enter into one
in the future. See Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 295.
157. As of May, 1996, 80% of the 125 APAs were bilateral or multilateral, an
increased ratio over 50% in August, 1994. See Bilateral Advance Pricing Agreements, supra note 154, at 1589.
158. See, e.g., Pre-Confirmation System To Be Made Law, supra note 110, at 94
(practitioners estimate that, as of June, 1996, about 20 large Japanese taxpayers
have requested U.S. APAs); see also Hitachi Expected To Receive U.S. APA, Company, Japanese Tax Sources Say, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 99, at G-2-G-3 (May
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There are several major issues with the use of APAs from
a business point of view. One of the major drawbacks to APAs,
as seen by both U.S. businesses and businesses of other countries, is the requirement of disclosure of sensitive information. 159 Another major drawback consists of the time and cost
involved in preparing an international APA.
Apple Computer was the first multinational corporation to
enter into an advance pricing agreement regarding transfer
pricing with the tax authorities of two jurisdictions, the United
States and Australia. 160 To date, Apple Computer, Inc. has
used advance pricing agreements with several of its foreign
subsidiaries, including Australia, Canada, Singapore, as well
as the first by a U.S. parent company between the IRS and
Japan's National Taxation Authority. The total cost of Apple's
Australian APA was approximately $200,000. 161 Although experience and data accumulated should reduce the costs of an
APA, each will require significant tailored research; preparation of Apple's APA included examination of pricing arrangements between Apple and Apple Japan, comparable transactions, and entities.
For the future, the United States and Japan are working
together not only to reduce the costs involved in the preparation of APAs, but also to encourage and facilitate the usage of
APAs. One milestone in easing the difficulty caused by the
different transfer pricing approaches occurred recently when
the NTA and the IRS granted an advance pricing agreement to
Komatsu, a Japanese firm with a U.S. unit, based on a hybrid
of the transfer pricing methodologies preferred by each. 162
22, 1996). Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Fuji Bank Ltd., and Sumitomo Bank
Ltd. of Osaka have obtained U.S. APAs. See Japanese Banks Seeking Bilateral
APAs, supra note 31, at 204.
159. In a survey of 210 multinational corporations representing 11% of the
Global 1000, this was found to be the major disadvantage of APAs from their
perspective. For this study of multinational corporations and their usage, concerns,
and beliefs regarding APAs, see Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at
297.
160. This agreement took place before the advent of the U.S.' formal program
for APAs. See id. at 294.
161. Internal time was estimated at about 1200 hours total. External
consultants' fees were $50,000 to $150,000 for each original submission. As of
1994, Apple's IRS User Fees were $10,000. See id. at 310.
162. The two methodologies are the comparable price method preferred by the
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C. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD)
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has been involved in the issue of taxation and reconciling
tax issues between states. In 1977, the OECD issued a model
treaty as an international standard for income tax treaty negotiations. 163 The members of the OECD took an early and firm
stance on transfer pricing, declaring that: "[e]nterprises should
refrain from making use of the particular facilities available to
them, such as transfer pricing which does not conform to an
arm's length standard, for modifying in ways contrary to national laws the tax base on which members of the group are
assessed."I64
In 1979, the OECD produced transfer pricing guidelines,
which are being revised to reflect current developments in
transfer pricing and to serve as guidelines in the international
tax arena. 16S A representative of the U.S. Treasury noted that
it "is difficult to over-emphasize the importance of these guidelines," describing them as "the consensus interpretation of the
arm's length standard," and noting their usage and acceptance

IRS and the profit split method used by NTA. See U.S.·Japan Tax Authorities
Agree to First 'Hybrid' Methodology APA For Japanese Firm, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA)
No. 95, at G-1 (May 16, 1996).
163. See Donald A. Finlayson, U.S. Source Income Earned by Foreign Branches
and Affiliates, 47 TAX LAw. 349, 362 (1994); see also Model Tax Convention on
Income, supra note 100. The OECD Model was revised in 1992 and again in 1995.
164. Declaration by the Governments of DECO Member Countries and Decisions
of the DECD Council on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises,
June 21, 1976, Annex-Taxation (2), as amended in 1979 and 1984, DECO, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (rev. ed. 1984) reprinted in 2 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw 565, 570 (American Society of Int'l Law ed., Commerce
Clearing House 1990).
165. See Samuels, supra note 28, at 64. For some of the diverse views of the
DECO Transfer Pricing Guidelines from different national perspectives, see, e.g.,
Toshiaki Katsushima, Perspective: DECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6-7 INTERTAX
273 (1995); AsSOCIATION OF GERMAN CHAMBERS OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE FEDERATION OF GERMAN INDUSTRIES, Comments on DECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines,
Part I-Discussion. Draft, 2 INTERTAX 93 (1995); FEDERATION DES EXPERTS
COMPI'ABLES EUROPEENS (Press Release), FEE Comments on Discussion Draft of
Part I of the DECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2 INTERTAX 104 (1995); ICC Com·
ments on DECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for MNEs and Tax Administrations Discussion Draft of Part I, 1 INTERTAX 39 (1995).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

31

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 3 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 9

224

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L. & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 3:1

in U.S. bilateral tax discussions. 166 Experts in the area of taxation and transfer pricing agree that "there will be a greater
role for organizations like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development than organizations based In one
country such as the IRS of the United States."167
Internationally accepted standards for transfer pricing will
promote the efficiency and effectiveness of transfer pricing
regulation and negotiations by and between states. 168 For example, the United States and Japan are moving toward a closer consensus based not only on their bilateral negotiations, but
also on their mutual involvement in the OECD. The IRS and
the U.S. Treasury worked with the OECD to ensure that the
OEeD interpretation of the arm's length standard and the
I.R.S. Regulations interpretation are consistent. 169 In fact, the
U.S. Treasury's position is that "there is no substantial difference between the U.S. and the OECD guidelines.,,17o The Japanese transfer pricing regime, as discussed above, was originally based on the OECD work. The serious involvement of a
number of states in the development and extension of the
OECD model for transfer pricing, although fraught with a
certain level of disagreement, clarifies, if not international
guidelines, at least areas of disagreement.
V. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED
A. FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT

While there are variations on the formula used, the most
basic formula approach to taxation compares property, payroll,

166. See Samuels, supra note 28, at 65.
167. See O'Connor, supra note 6, at iv.
168. This is indicated by the amount of time spent by and between states interpreting and negotiating differences in tax policies and accounting principles. These
negotiations are not only time-consuming, but also not always successful. Differences in the tax policies and customary practices of Japan and the U.S. and the
resulting differences in interpretation of pricing and costs are cited as the predominant factors in competent authority negotiations between the U.S. and Japan in
the last decade. See Some 20 Cases in U.S.-Japan Negotiations But Several At
Stalemate, Sources Say, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at G-l (Feb. 21, 1995).
169. See Birnkrant & Croker, Jr., supra note 15, at 268.
170. See Bilateral Advance Pricing Agreements, supra note 154, at 1589 (quoting
Michael Durst, director of the AFA program).
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and sales in each country where a business operates. One
suggestion for formulary apportionment is worldwide unitary
apportionment based on the California model. 171 The states of
the U.S. use formulary apportionment to allocate income
earned by multistate businesses between the states. 172 The
formulary approach determines the overall worldwide profits of
an entity and allocates it to countries based on a mathematical
formula. 173
This method has been considered as a solution by many
authors and is being studied by officials in the United
States,174 although not supported by many involved in transfer pricing, including members of the Treasury.175 California's
worldwide unitary apportioning method was upheld by the
U.S. Supreme Court which held that it was "fairly apportioned,
nondiscriminatory, fairly related to the services provided by
the State, and that its imposition did not result inevitably in
multiple taxation."176
Worldwide unitary apportioning is advocated on the theory
that it is a more effective means for taxing multinational corporations which are inherently interdependent. 177 A benefit of
the unitary system to taxpayers is non-interference with transfer pricing or financial decisions of the taxpayers. 178 In order
for worldwide unitary apportioning to be successfully implemented, wide-scale support and change would be essential. 179
171. See Tyson, supra note 126, at 35.
172. Michael S. Schadewald, Global Apportionment: How Would It Affect the
Largest U.S. Corporations?, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 131 (July 8, 1996).
173. For examples and explanations of how variations impact the outcome, see
id. at 135-137; see also Multinationals Concerned About Treasury Conducting Study
for Dorgan, 159 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Aug. 17, 1995, at G-3 [hereinafter Multinationals Concerned About Tr..easury Conducting Study].
174. The General Accounting Office issued a report on the possibilities of using
a formulary system for the United States at a national level, and the Treasury
Department is also preparing its own study. See e.g., Multinationals Concerned
About Treasury Conducting Study, supra note 172, at G-3; see also Schadewald,
supra note 171, at 131 (presents a study representing the differences in taxable
U.S. profits for 1994 of 50 of the largest U.S. corporations using the formulary
method versus arm's length transfer pricing).
175. See, e.g., Samuels, supra note 28, at 67.
176. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S: Ct. 2268, 2278 (1994).
177. See Tyson, supra note 126, at 47.
178. See id. at 51.
179. See id. at 48; see also Samuels, supra note 28, at 67_
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Formulary apportionment is opposed by many multinationals as causing double taxation of foreign earned income ISO
and creating additional compliance and administrative burdens. lsl It is also strongly opposed by the DEeD draft report
on Transfer Pricing as difficult to implement due to the need
for consensus as to a formula and the numerous accounting
factors used therein. lB2
Any formula approach to analyzing pricing, by its nature,
neglects to consider reasons other than tax manipulation for
non-arm's length prices between related entities. lB3 A fair examination to determine the existence of abusive transfer would
require examining a number of other potential reasons for
differential pricing practices. These include a number of general business reasons, such as market penetration, associated
products, and valued long-term business relationships, among
others. A number of cultural reasons could also account for differential pricing policies between parties which are related,
including, among others: family ties, tradition, valued longterm relationships, and supporting the business efforts of an
economically less competitive entity due to affiliation, relationship, or friendship. The formulary approach does not always
allocate taxation consistent with reality or fairness.
The fundamental difference between arm's length method
and formula method is that the former must be determined for
each operation, whereas the formula method uses the
taxpayer's average internal rate of return on its worldwide

180. See, e.g., Multinationals Concerned About Treasury Conducting Study, supra
note 172, at G-3 (quoting Dave Jory, tax attorney for Citicorp as saying that Citicorp opposes formulary apportionment as it "would virtually guarantee double
taxation of our income earned abroad.").
181. See, e.g., id. at G-3 (quoting Alex Spitzer, senior vice president of taxes at
Nestle).
182. See Samuels, supra note 28, at 67 (positing that, due to the extent of the
differences and definitions to be reconciled, a Multinational Tax Commission of
some form would be required, with concordant delegation of some domestic tax
policy).
183. See Lodin, supra note 27, at 240 (discussing the United States' 1992 proposed regulations, Sven-Olof Lodin, a professor and policy advisor to Swedish industry, comments that the proposed regulations "represent an endeavor for fiscal
perfectionism, which seems to forget that transfer prices are generally based on
business purposes and not the avoidance of US taxes.")
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operations. l84 Several specific business factors which can
cause the results of formulary apportionment to differ greatly
from an arm's length analysis include: varying exchange
rates,185 differences between the products and services produced and sold in various countries, labor costs, customer preferences, local economic conditions, and other location-specific
factors. 186
B. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION SYSTEM

One possible solution to facilitate the effective and efficient
administration of taxation of international transactions would
be to implement an international taxation system. The international community has long recognized that the governance of
multinational business requires at least multinational agreement, if not a multinational governing body or bodies. Issues of
sovereignty sometimes impede the multinational/multilateral
regulation of business practice, but pragmatism and growing
international interdependence encourage and require the continued development and application of international private
law to multinational business activities. However, taxation is
still considered a sovereignty issue which may allow for bilateral or multinational discussion, but remains a decision of each
nation.
One theory is that: "[T]he Nation State has become an
unnatural, even dysfunctional, unit for organizing human
activity and managing economic endeavor in a borderless
world ... it overlooks the true linkages and synergies that
exist among often disparate populations by combining important measures of human activity at the wrong level of analysis."187 Although the role of international law continues to
grow in the world community and plays an increasing role
within nations, tension remains between a nation's desire for
sovereignty and the facilitation provided by international law.

184. See Schadewald, supra note 171, at 132.
185. See Tyson, supra note 126, at 43.
186. See Schadewald, supra note 171, at 137-138.
187. Kenichi Ohmae, The Rise of the Region State, 72 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 78
(1993) (arguing that the economy is undeniably global in nature, made up of regions and states sharing certain economic and consumer interests).
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However, the trend, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century, has been for countries to forsake an increasing
amount of sovereignty for international development and stability. International law is developing increased presence and
importance in many realms of life, including, among others:
human rights, peace and war, maritime activities, environment, politics, developmental issues, and, due to its enormous
impacts on the world community and across state boundaries,
international business. 188
Although the harmonization of effective corporate rates
among nations would preclude the use of corporate income
taxation as a national policy tool,189 hopefully, the growing
body of bilateral treaties, multilateral guidelines, agreements,
and conventions on the subject of transfer pricing embodies
growing consensus within the international community. The
rapid development of international standards, conventions,
understandings, and practices regarding transfer pricing could
arguably be construed as international law, although it has not
been recognized as such. Outside of taxation, nations, business
entities, and individuals are increasingly required to be familiar with and respect international private law as it applies to
multinational business interests and the entities which develop, interpret, and apply it. In order to truly address the issue
of appropriate taxation in the face of transfer pricing, nations
and the international community as a whole must reach agreementes) as to the purpose of this taxation and design taxation
process(es) to accomplish the purpose(s).
The possible advantages of an international tax system are
many. A tax with a single form for the international tax administration would require the taxpayer to comply with one set
of document and information requests. Additionally, compliance with a single set of rules would be easier to figure out
without the juggling necessary to maintain consistency with
several regimes simultaneously.

188. For a discussion of the rapidly increasing body and importance of international trade law as it intersects with American trade law, and the resulting
gaps and difficulties, see generally Garten, supra note 20, at 15.
189. See Tyson, supra note 126, at 49.
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An international tax administration should prove not only
less costly, but also much easier from a state governmental
point of view. The international tax administration could handle apportionment of funds. An impartial international body
could not only be neutral, but also reduce costs by its neutrality and result in fairer results for poorer nations by providing
them with a certain sum of income, which they may not have
the administration or the might to collect on their own.
C.

FLAT TAX

The use of a flat (or uniform rate of) tax would not address
the individual nature of each transaction, but, in not doing so,
it would eliminate a phenomenal amount of administration
and research costs for both the taxpayers and the tax administrations involved. There is a desire to use precedent in order to
be just and to facilitate the development of a body of transfer
pricing law. However, in the area of taxation, there are not
only issues of confidentiality and proprietary information, 190
but also the fact that each case is truly unique.
A flat tax would ease the difficulty of compliance with
transfer pricing regulations, which is incredibly burdensome
for tax administrative bodies and for taxpayers. 191 The major
cost component and area of disagreement in resolving transfer
pricing issues are the determinations of the existence and
extent of abusive transfer pricing. The determination of proper
pricing is by its definition very complex;192 an accurate analysis of pricing requires an understanding of: the industry; the
relationships; the competitors; fluctuations and developments
in, and history of the market; an understanding of the relationships and goals involved in a set of transactions; and the ability to accurately discern the profit margin. The determination

190. In a survey of 210 multinational corporations representing 11% of the
Global 1000, this was found to be the major disadvantage of APAs from their
perspective. See Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 307.
191. Cf Wolosoff, supra note 38, at 706; see also Taxpayers Should Not Rush
into Studies for §6662 Purposes, supra note 58, at 111 (quoting Alan O. Dixler,
Merck & Co.'s senior tax counsel, as stating that transfer pricing compliance can
be summed up by the acronym SARA: "shock, anger, rejection, and acceptance.").
192. For a succinct entertaining criticism of transfer pricing methodologies, see
O'Connor, supra note 6, at ix-xi.
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of profit itself is complex and allows for such an array of different results that profit is a nebulous basis for payment in a contract situation and certainly in a taxation system. The determination of whether or not parties are related is time-consuming
and often impossible to determine with accuracy.193 The time
involved in researching transfer pricing for intangibles is phenomenal and usually ends up being based on subjective comparisons and analyses. 194
The problems with trying to state every possible issue is
seen by the proliferation of the regulations, treaties, conventions, and administrative bodies with little resulting clarity.
This issue is likely to become exacerbated as an increasing
number of smaller companies have access to and participate in
international markets and face possible transfer pricing issues. 195 A flat tax would eliminate the enormous, increasing
amount of time, staff, and money required of taxpayers and tax
administrations in order to handle transfer pricing issues 196

VI. CONCLUSION
A systemic analysis of taxation of entities involved in international business requires examining stakeholders in the
global marketplace as a whole, the goals of each, the current
structures, systems and processes in place, and how these do
193. Apple Computer Completes Bilateral U.S.-Japanese APA, Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA) No. 164, at G-2 (Aug. 24, 1995).
194. The OECD report notes that establishing comparables for determining
arm's length pricing for intangibles must include a careful consideration of several
factors which affect comparability: the potential profits from use of intangible property, any geographical limitations on usage, any restrictions on exportations of
goods, exclusivity of the rights transferred, and whether the licensee has rights to
the licensor's further developments of the intangible property. See Marc M. Levey
& Lawrence W. Shapiro, DECD Transfer Pricing Draft Targets Excessive Documentation, 6 J. INT'L TAX'N 244, 245 (1995).
195. The temporary § 482 regulations addressed the issue of a small business
safe harbor, based on computing transfer prices according to profit level indicators
to be published by the Service. The final regulations did not include a safe harbor
due to concerns by the Service and foreign treaty partners that the safe harbors
might be misapplied or result in inaccurate reporting of income. See Hirsh et aI.,
supra note 33, at 593.
196. TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION ISSUES, supra, note 4, at L-1 (estimating
that IRS examiners, economists, and appeals staff spent about 186 staff years on
cases related to transfer pricing closed in fiscal 1993 and about 227 staff years on
those closed in fiscal year 1992).
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or do not interact and function. Theoretically, the goal of taxation is that the total tax paid by each entity represents a fair
and reasonable contribution of a portion of income towards the
maintenance of the system or a part thereof. In an ideal system, there would be an equitable distribution of tax between
jurisdictions. A well-designed tax system would motivate investment and development that would support international
goals regarding development, the environment, and society, to
name a few.
The inherent weaknesses of tax models and model structures in general are their single dimensionality and inadequate
feedback. Like most models, tax models do not take adequate
cognizance of evolution within a system. The structure of a
model is often unable to adjust for changes in the external
environment.
As the cost to the state of getting the revenue is exorbitant
and becoming more so, while the efficacy of doing so is limited,
other less cumbersome solutions should be and are being explored. Aside from the jurisdictional issues causing overlapping
taxation, the body of tax law and regulations designed by nations to tax "their share"197 of international transactions is
complex, overwhelmingly detailed, cumbersome, expensive,
confusing, and time-consuming to apply. The tax administrations must design rules and mechanisms to analyze and verify
the reality of pricing strategies between entities, which mayor
may not be designed to minimize or eliminate taxation. Also,
nations must resolve whether and how to work with other
nations to resolve, reconcile, or compromise on administering
and resolving issues of double taxation.
In a perfect solution, income would only be taxed once by
the jurisdiction where that income is being produced; however,
the location of income generation is often ambiguous and difficult to ascertain with certainty. Additionally, the determination of whether the transfer price actually reflects the income
generated is more difficult to assess than is immediately ap-

197. The national tax authorities represent the interests of their own nations
and the interpretations and applications of transfer pricing regulations which will
benefit their nations. See Lodin, supra note 27, at 240.
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parent. In assessing pricing between related entities, many
countries look to comparable transactions; but, is the "real
price" what another entity would charge an unrelated entity?
Pricing is done for tax reasons, but also for other reasons,
including: growth strategy, capturing a market, introduction of
a product/service, capturing other related markets (e.g. cellular
telephones for $1), and the creation of future consumers.
It would seem logical that to eliminate transfer pricing
issues, either the tax to be assessed must be based on "nonfudge able criteria" or taxation should be by one entity internationally, with an effective and equitable distribution to the
specific nations. The plethora of codes, regulations, rules, and
administrators indicates the difficulty of doing so under the
arm's length standard now applied. Given that it is currently
estimated that almost half of all trade among the more developed nations takes place between related parties,198 ascertaining a true arm's length price may be difficult or impossible.
However, one U.S. Treasury official sums up the debate as to
international transfer pricing methodologies: "[T]he primary
advantage that the arm's length standard currently enjoys in
relation to formulary apportionment is the simple fact that
most of the world agrees that it should be the international
norm.,,199

In the international realm, since trade has been seen to
require multilateral treaties, then why not taxes? From the
point of view of the taxpaying business entities, some certainty
or confidence as to tax treatment would help in their shortand long-term strategic and financial planning. Yet, the administration and collection of tax revenue where transfer pricing is involved are far from consistent. From a state point of
view they are far from successful, and the role of tax policy as
a force for development or change has been lost. Even if taxation was done on an international level or according to some
harmonized taxation scheme, tax could be used to encourage
domestic or international policies through means other than
the amount assessed, such as rebates or industry specific application of revenues. However, the key problem with the cur198. See Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing, supra note 2, at 299.
199. See Samuels, supra note 28, at 68.
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rent state of transfer pricing regulation as epitiomized by the
American approach is that it pays little or no attention to the
fact that the transfer pricing problems are general international problems affecting many countries and that this must be
taken into account when formulating the rules. 20o

200. Lodin, supra note 27, at 240.
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